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D4MES & MOORE v. REGAN: CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS HELD
HOSTAGE BY EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1981, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,' the United States
Supreme Court judicially ended the fourteen-month Iranian hostage
crisis of 1979-1981. The Court's decision gave legal effect to the Alge-
rian Accords, which permitted the transfer of Iranian assets out of the
United States .by the required deadline of July 19, 1981.2 In the process,
the Court sanctioned the presidential nullification of prejudgment at-
tachments on Iranian assets in the United States.' The majority,
through Justice Rehnquist,4 specifically held that the International
1. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants seized the American
Embassy in Teheran, Iran, and took 66 American nationals hostage in reaction to the admis-
sion of the former Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment. Continuous
negotiations between the United States and Iran led to the signing in Algeria of two execu-
tive agreements on January 19, 1981 by Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher,
and to the exchange of the 52 American hostages then remaining in Iran. The agreements
provided for a return to Iran of approximately three to four billion dollars of Iranian assets
frozen in the United States and a prohibition of legal proceedings against Iran in American
courts. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [hereinafter cited as Algerian
Accords], reprinted in McGreevey, The Iranian Crisis and U.S. Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 384, 447-54 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McGreeveyl. For detailed statements of the
facts and events surrounding the hostage crisis, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at
662-68; Norton & Collins, Reflections on the Iranian Hostage Settlement, 67 A.B.A. J. 428-33
(1981); Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3,
reprintedin M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 223 (1981); and Note, Settlement of the Iranian Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of
Constitutional and Statutory Prerogative in Foreign Affairs, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 993
(1981).
2. In the words of the first Algerian Accord, "the United States will act to bring about
the transfer to the Central Bank [of Iran], within six months from [the] date [of the Accords],
of all Iranian deposits and securities in U.S. banking institutions in the United States .
Algerian Accords, reprinted in McGreevey, supra note 1, at 449.
3. 453 U.S. at 672-75. Among these prejudgment attachments was an attachment exe-
cuted by a California federal district court to satisfy Dames and Moore's claim for breach of
contract against the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. For an explanation of the facts in
Dames, see infra text accompanying notes 11-26.
4. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun.
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Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA)5 gave the President
express power to nullify attachments on foreign assets in declared na-
tional emergencies and transfer them out of the country. The majority
further held that Congress had impliedly acquiesced in the presidential
use of international executive agreements to settle the claims of Ameri-
can nationals against foreign governments and agencies.
The Dames decision approved the transfer of American claims, se-
cured by attached assets, out of American courts and into the uncertain
arena of an International Claims Tribunal.8 Based on exceedingly
scarce authority,9 the Court held that the IEEPA empowered the Presi-
dent unilaterally to manipulate foreign assets in order to end a national
emergency which he alone had discretion to declare.'" The Court's
analysis, thereby, led to the "unsettling," rather than to the settling, of
American claims against Iran.
It is the thesis of this note that, although the President does possess
the explicit authority under the IEEPA to attach and nullify attach-
ments on foreign assets, no express constitutional clause empowers the
President to utilize international executive agreements to accomplish
these ends. The exigencies of the modem international negotiating pro-
cess, however, compel the conclusion that the Chief Executive must be
granted more flexibility to deal with other nations than is permitted by
a strict reading of the pertinent constitutional provisions.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On November 14, 1979, ten days after the seizure of sixty-six
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA].
6. 453 U.S. at 675.
7. Id at 688. The Dames Court narrowed the scope of its decision to hold merely that
where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the
President's action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to
settle such claims.
Id
8. This is the substance of the second Algerian Accord on the establishment of an Inter-
national Arbitral Tribunal to decide claims of nationals of either country against the other.
See Algerian Accords, reprinted in McGreevey, supra note 1, at 452-54. "All decisions and
awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding." Id at 453.
9. The Dames Court recognized that "'[a] judge. . . may be surprised at the poverty
of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive
power as they actually present themselves."' 453 U.S. at 660 (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
10. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (Supp. IV 1980), recognizes the President's broad au-
thority to respond to foreign threats "if the President declares a national emergency with
respect to such threat."
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American hostages in Teheran, Iran, former President Carter, under
the authority vested in him by IEEPA sections 1701-1706,11 issued Ex-
ecutive Order Number 12,170,12 which prevented the withdrawal of all
Iranian property and interests from the United States." The order also
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to implement the presidential
directives. 4 Pursuant to this order the administration promulgated
Treasury regulations on November 15, 1979 which required that at-
tachments on Iranian assets be licensed by the Treasury Department 5
and further provided that any such license could be revoked at any
time.1 6 A clarifying regulation of December 19, 1979, granted a blanket
license to attach Iranian property prior to judgment, although attached
property could not be transferred to satisfy the claim of a judgment
creditor. 17
On December 19, 1979, Dames and Moore, a corporation, filed
suit in the Federal District Court for the Central District of California
against the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and alleged that it was
owed money under a contract."8 To secure judgment, the court ordered
an attachment on certain Iranian property, pursuant to the Treasury
regulation of December nineteen. 9 On January 19, 1981, the Algerian
Accords were signed. The Accords provided for the transfer of Iranian
assets out of the United States and the termination of all litigation
against Iran.20 The same day, President Carter issued Executive Orders
Numbers 12,276-12,285, which implemented the terms of the Ac-
11. The IEEPA allows the President, after declaring a national emergency, to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ac-
quisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importa-
tion or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign coun-
try or a national thereof has any interest ....
50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
12. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
13. The President took this action after announcements by Iran that it planned to with-
draw all of its funds deposited in American banks. McGreevey, supra note 1, at 386.
14. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
15. Treas. Reg. § 535.203(e), 31 C.F.R. 667 (1980).
16. Treas. Reg. § 535.805, 31 C.F.R. 684 (1980).
17. Treas. Reg. § 535.418, 31 C.F.R. 672 (1980).
18. 453 U.S. at 663-64. The contract, to perform site studies for a nuclear power plant in
Iran, was entered into between the Organization and a Dames and Moore subsidiary,
Dames and Moore International, S.R.L.; upon unilateral termination of the agreement by
the Atomic Energy Organization in 1979, Dames and Moore sued for approximately $3.5
million for services which it claimed it had performed prior to the termination. Id at 664.
19. Id The property of certain Iranian banks was attached to secure the judgment. Id
20. Id at 664-65; see the "General Principles" of the first Algerian Accord, reprinted in
McGreevey, supra note 1, at 447; paras. 4-9 of the first Accord, reprinted in McGreevey,
supra note 1, at 448-50.
1982]
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cords.2" President Reagan, on February 24, 1981, endorsed the Accords
by providing for the suspension of all American claims against Iran,
save those presented to the International Arbitral Tribunal established
by the second Algerian Accord.22
On January 27, 1981, Dames and Moore was awarded summary
judgment against Iran. However, enforcement of the judgment through
levy of execution was stayed pending appeal, and the prejudgment at-
tachments were vacated in light of the Accords and the executive or-
ders.2 Dames and Moore subsequently filed suit against Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan to prevent enforcement of the Accords. It
contended that the President had exceeded his statutory and constitu-
tional authority in adversely affecting the corporation's claims against
Iran.24 The district court denied petitioner's motion, although it prohib-
ited transfer of the Iranian property.25 Because of the urgency of the
Iranian crisis, appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court, and cer-
tiorari was granted.26
IlI. HOLDING AND REASONING OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court focused on two central issues: (1) the power of
the President to nullify the attachment of assets; and (2) the use of exec-
utive agreements to compel transfer of American claims from domestic
courts to an international tribunal.27 The majority held that the IEEPA
gave the President express authority to nullify attachments and did not
21. 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-32 (1981). As the Dames Court persuasively argued, the Presi-
dent's action in these orders was also taken pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 535.805, 31 C.F.R. 684
(1980), which made the license to attach expressly revocable. 453 U.S. at 673.
22. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111-12 (1981).
23. 453 U.S. at 666.
24. Id at 666-67.
25. Id at 667.
26. 452 U.S. 932 (1981).
27. The Dames Court initially formulated the second issue as whether the President may
suspend claims pending in American courts, as President Reagan purported to do in Execu-
tive Order Number 12,294. 453 U.S. at 675. The Court then broadened its discussion, how-
ever, to hold that "international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against
the government of another 'are established international practice reflecting traditional inter-
national theory.'" Id at 679 (quoting L. HENJiN, FOREIoN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 262 (1972)) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as HENKiN]. The Court noted that
"[t]hough these settlements have sometimes been made by treaty, there has also been a long-
standing practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the advice and
consent of the Senate." 453 U.S. at 679 (footnote omitted). Further strengthening the Court's
argument was its finding that indeed "Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim
settlement by executive agreement." Id at 680. Apparently, the Court felt more comfortable
in basing its decision on the Algerian Accords, the making of which by the Executive is at
least arguably justified, rather than on the constitutionally novel theory that the President
Vol. 15
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limit his power to act in national emergencies. 28 By the time Dames
and Moore had filed suit, the President had already frozen Iranian as-
sets and granted the revocable licenses.29 Relying on Justice Jackson's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,30 the Dames
Court concluded that the President had acted pursuant to specific, ex-
press congressional authorization. Finally, from a public policy point of
view, the Court persuasively argued that the President needed freedom
to use frozen assets as "bargaining chips" in delicate negotiations.
31
The Court reasoned that if such power were not granted to the Execu-
tive, "the Federal Government as a whole [would] lack. . . the power
exercised by the President."
3 2
The majority analyzed the constitutionality of executive agree-
ments by first holding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act of
may dispense with the claims of American nationals against foreign entities through an ex-
ecutive order alone. See supra note 7.
28. 453 U.S. at 675-80. The Court was aided by two circuit courts of appeals decisions
construing the IEEPA: Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651
F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981), and American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657
F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. 453 U.S. at 673.
30. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Justice Jackson's analysis of the division between presidential
and congressional power was critical to the Court's decision in Dames:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate .... If his act is held unconstitu-
tional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as
an undivided whole lacks power ... [his action] would be supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a Congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is unertain ... .[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes. . . enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the im-
peratives of events and contemporary imponderables ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb ... .Courts can sustain exclusive
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject.
Id at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). It is interesting to note that Jus-
tice Rehnquist uses the Jackson analysis heavily when discussing the first issue, since appar-
ently the President's power is at its height. Yet, where discussing the implied congressional
delegation of the power to settle claims by executive agreement, a power which might reflect
a "zone of twilight" or even a "lowest ebb" analysis, he virtually relegates Youngstown to the
shelf. See infra notes 48-50, 143-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Youngstown, see infra notes 194-238 and accompanying text.
31. 453 U.S. at 673-74.
32. Id at 674.
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186833 expressly authorizes the suspension of American claims against
foreign entities.34 The Court then reasoned that the fact that Congress
had never affinmatively devised a method for claims settlement indi-
cated implied legislative approval of unilateral executive action. 5 The
majority then buttressed its opinion by declaring that "prior cases of
this Court have also recognized that the President does have some
measure of power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate. '36 The Court stated that Con-
gress' failure to object expressly to the use of executive agreements
could be construed to create a rule of customary constitutional law le-
gitimizing unilateral presidential agreements. 37 There existed "'a sys-
tematic, unbroken executive practice [of using executive agreements],
long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before
questioned.' "38
Finally, the Dames Court concluded that the establishment of the
International Arbitral Tribunal rendered premature any discussion of
possible due process problems.39 This conclusion was disputed by Jus-
tice Powell.40 The Court also held that the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act41 did not divest the President of the authority to settle claims,
and that the Algerian Accords did not have the effect of limiting the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.42
33. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
34. 453 U.S. at 677.
35. Id at 679-82. The Dames Court used a case decided three days before Dames, Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), involving revocation of the passport of a former CIA agent
who had made public the identities of fellow intelligence agents. The Court held that the
State Department had properly revoked Agee's passport, even though Congress had not
expressly authorized the executive branch to take such action. The Dames Court relied on
A4gee for the proposition that the "failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does
not, 'especially.. . in the areas of foreign policy and national security,' imply 'congressional
disapproval' of action taken by the Executive." Dames, 453 U.S. at 678 (quoting Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. at 291). Congress could scarcely have consolidated its approval or disap-
proval in the three days between Haig and Dames. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jack-
son, J., concurring). The Dames Court found such legislative approval in Congress' adoption
of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1976) [herein-
after cited as ICSA].
36. 453 U.S. at 682. The "prior cases" cited by Rehnquist are one in number, United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Pink, see
infra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 157-60, 180-90.
38. 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
39. 453 U.S. at 688-89.
40. Id at 690-91 (Powell, 3., concurring and dissenting in part).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
42. 453 U.S. at 684-86.
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IV. ANALYSIS
At. The ZEEPA and the President's Authority to Attach and Nullif
Attachments of Foreign Assets
1. The IEEPA and the Trading with the Enemy Act
The majority opinion, after recognizing that section 1702 (a)(1)(B)
of the IEEPA43 copied section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act
of 1917 (TWEA),4 determined that the legislative histories of the two
Acts, as well as relevant case law, sustained the presidential nullifica-
tion of attachments on foreign assets.4 5 The Court, however, cited only
a single Supreme Court case, Orvis v. Brownell,46 in support of this ex-
ecutive power. The Court made no mention of either the committee
reports or statements in the Congressional Record which explained the
purpose of the IEEPA. The Court did acknowledge at one point that
"Congress intended to limit the President's emergency power in peace-
time ....
The Court's reliance on the IEEPA's legislative history was unnec-
essary. The statute unambiguously grants the President power to "com-
pel, nullify,. . . prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding,. . . [or]
transfer... of... any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest."48 A broad definition of the word
"holding" could reasonably embrace "attachments," and, because the
majority determined that the President operated under an express con-
43. IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 11.
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(1)(B) of the IEEPA is identical in language to 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 5(b)(1)(B) (1976) [hereinafter cited as TWEA]. Although the TWEA was passed in 1917 to
deal only with war, (H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) states that the Act
"did not include a provision permitting use of the act during national emergency..."),
President Roosevelt used it to declare a bank holiday to prevent hoarding of gold. Id; see
Comment, Presidential Emergency Powers Related to International Economic Transactions:
Congressional Recognition of Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 518
(1978). Thereafter, between 1941 and 1971, the TWEA was used to attach assets in the
United States of Axis-occupied countries, to create consumer credit controls to fight infla-
tion, to establish foreign direct investment controls on American investors, and to impose a
surcharge on imports. See H.R. REP. No. 459, supra, at 5.
45. 453 U.S. at 672-74.
46. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
47. 453 U.S. at 672-73.
48. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981), held that "[t]he President's actions...
are in keeping with the language of IEEPA: initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'trans-
fers' of Iranian assets; later he 'direct[ed] and compel[led]' the 'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of
the assets." Id. at 806.
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gressional grant of authority,49 the "widest latitude of judicial interpre-
tation ' 5 would readily permit such a broad definition.
Still, the legislative history of the IEEPA demonstrates that Con-
gress was concerned with the extent of presidential power in foreign
affairs. The statute was intended to give the Executive "narrow...
powers subject to congressional review in times of 'national emergency'
short of war"51 because the President, prior to the Act, possessed unilat-
eral power to declare such emergencies without consulting Congress.
5 2
Nonetheless, the Act was not intended in any way to "t[ie] the Presi-
dent's hands in times of crisis."53 Thus, in adopting the IEEPA, Con-
gress recognized the need for presidential flexibility in responding to
real emergencies, a category which indisputably included the Iranian
crisis. It was against this rather paradoxical background that the
IEEPA was enacted in 1977.
2. Changes effected by IEEPA and Orvis v. Brownell
The Dames Court might have noted that the IEEPA did very little
to limit the President's power in foreign affairs.54 It is significant, for
example, that the specific section relied upon by President Carter in
issuing Executive Order Number 12,170, section 1702 (a)(1)(B), was
adopted verbatim from the TWEA.55 The Court could have refuted
Dames and Moore's use of the IEEPA's legislative history by pointing
out that this section was not intended to alter the scope of executive
authority. As one Justice has stated, "[it would be not merely infelici-
tous draftsmanship but almost offensive gaucherie to write. .. a re-
striction upon the President's power in terms into a statute"56 which
49. 453 U.S. at 672.
50. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, 3., concurring).
51. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 44, at 1. The Senate report was preoccupied with use
of the extensive TWEA powers "to regulate both domestic and international economic
transactions unrelated to a declared state of emergency." S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1977). The Dames Court could plausibly have asserted that the powers exercised by
President Carter were directly related to a real, recognized national emergency, as part of
the bargaining chip theory. 453 U.S. at 673.
52. 123 CONG. REc. H6872 (daily ed. July 12, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Leggett),
53. Id
54. The minimal change in substantive law lends credence to President Carter's state-
ment upon signing the IEEPA that "[t]he bill is largely procedural . . . [and] does [not]
affect the blockage of assets." Presidential War Powers Bill, Statement on Signing H.R. 7738
Into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1941 (Dec. 28, 1977). See infra text accompanying
notes 55-59.
55. See supra note 44.
56. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Youngstown, the issue
was the refusal of Congress to grant the President power to seize domestic property. The
[V l. 15
DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN
patently confers that power upon him.
The Court appeared reluctant to discuss a major substantive differ-
ence between the language of the pertinent TWEA provision and that
in the IEEPA, perhaps because acknowledging the alteration would
greatly have weakened the Court's reliance on Orvis v. Brownell57 as
authority for the President's actions at issue in Dames. Section 5(b)(1)
of the TWEA provides in part that "any property or interest of any
foreign country or national thereof shall vest . . . in such agency or
person as may be designated .. .by the President, and upon such
terms and conditions as the President may prescribe ... ." This pro-
vision was omitted from the IEEPA, which provides in part: "this grant
of authority does not include. . . the power to vest. . . foreign prop-
erty.. . ." The majority might have noted that Congress was indeed
serious about limiting the President's power, but only the power to vest
foreign property, not the power to attach assets and then nullify these
attachments.
Orvis v. Brownell was the sole precedent used by the Court to sup-
port the President's powers under the TWEA. In Orvis, the property of
Japanese nationals was vested in an Alien Property Custodian after an
executive order blocked all transfers of Japanese property in the United
States.60 Between the time of the executive order and the vesting, the
petitioners obtained an unlicensed attachment and judgment. The
Court was asked to decide whether the attachment created a property
interest sufficient to divest title in the Custodian and vest it in the peti-
tioners.61 Significantly, the Orvis Court's opinion recognized that, al-
though the attachment of assets was not sufficient to divest the
Custodian of the property,62 "the executive freezing order did not pre-
vent such an attachment from creating rights between the judgment
creditor and the enemy debtor whom the Custodian had elected to suc-
ceed."63 Because the vesting power was expressly nullified by the
IEEPA, that part of the Orvis opinion which upheld the superior right
in the Custodian, an executive functionary, is severely undermined. Ac-
cordingly, the Orvis case may mean that a creditor who obtains an at-
argument in Dames is bolstered by the fact that express authority to attach foreign assets was
granted
57. 345 U.S. 183 (1953); see infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
58. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1976).
59. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 44, at 15.
60. 345 U.S. at 184-85.
61. Id at 185.
62. Id at 189.
63. Id at 186.
19821
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tachment lien has a paramount right to the attached property once he
recovers judgmentf 4
Thus, contrary to the Dames Court's interpretation, Orvis does not
mean "that an American claimant may not use an attachment that is
subject to a revocable licenset651 and that has been obtained after the
entry of a freeze order to limit. . the actions the President may take
under § 1702 respecting the frozen assets."66 The Dames opinion cor-
rectly points out, however, that "[a]lthough it is true the IEEPA does
not give the President the power to 'vest' . . . the assets, it does not
follow that the President is not authorized . . . to otherwise perma-
nently dispose of the assets."67 Indeed, Congress has clearly indicated
that such executive action is appropriate where "[a] national emergency
[is] declared and emergency authorities [are] employed only with re-
spect to a specific set of circumstances which constitute a real emer-
gency."'68 That the events in Iran constituted a "real emergency" is
scarcely open to question. The IEEPA, adopted in recognition of the
President's need for "standby emergency authority to deal with unusual
and extraordinary economic crises,"'69 was well suited for use on No-
vember 14, 1979.0
64. See id at 186-87. The court's opinion in Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (Ist Cir. 1981), recognizes the difficulties in using Orvis
as authority, but in Main, the President had not attempted to cause Iranian assets to vest in
the executive branch, but had merely ordered their transfer without bringing about any
change in title. Id at 808.
65. Although the revocable license might seem to be dispositive, Orris appears to hold
that if the vesting procedure is invalid, even an unlicensed attachment will be valid against a
foreign debtor. 345 U.S. at 186.
66. 453 U.S. at 672-73 n.5.
67. Id
68. H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 44, at 10.
69. 123 CONG. REc. H6870 (daily ed. July 12, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
70. Two other changes in the IEEPA merit brief attention. First, § 1703(a) provides that
"[t]he President, in every possible instance shall consult with the Congress before exercising
any of the authorities granted by this chapter." 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Al-
though the section need not be construed as requiring submission of a report as a prerequi-
site for taking action in possible emergencies, H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 44, at 16, it is
curious that President Carter took no action to consult with Congress in the ten days be-
tween the seizure of the hostages and the issuance of Executive Order Number 12,170.
Second, in the original House version, Congress could veto any regulation taken by the
President under the IEEPA. See H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 44, at 16. The Senate ver-
sion, however, removed this veto power from the Congress. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 51,
at 2. A strong case could be made that the excision of this provision indicated that the
Congress ultimately decided that the President should have the unilateral power to act under
the IEEPA. The Senate, however, rejected the proposal, not because it felt that it should not
have the power to veto presidential declarations under the IEEPA, but because it was con-
vinced that it already had the power, under the National Emergencies Act, to overrule or
veto the President's declaration of an emergency. 123 CONG. REc. H12,559 (daily ed. Nov.
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3. Conclusions
The comprehensive language of the IEEPA gives the President the
express authority to attach and dispose of foreign assets. In a national
emergency the President, pursuant to express congressional authoriza-
tion, may properly freeze foreign assets for use as a "bargaining chip"
in delicate negotiations and expressly retain the right at any time to
revoke licenses to attach these assets. The Court was aware of the seri-
ous implications of lodging such power in the Executive, however, and
was constrained by the expedited briefing schedule. The Court thus ac-
knowledged "the necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible
ground capable of deciding the case.""1 The decision nonetheless has
broad implications for the division of power between the political
branches in the foreign affairs arena, partially because Congress was
extremely reticent to voice opposition to presidential actions regarding
the volatile Iranian crisis. If Congress continues to remain silent and
inactive in similar situations, Dames may well represent a new mile-
stone on the way to the "Imperial Presidency."72
B. The Use of International Executive Agreements to Settle the
Claims of American Nationals Against Foreign Governments
and Their Entities
1. Possible sources of the power to conclude
executive agreements
a. the Constitution and the intent of the Founders
i. the enumerated powers doctrine
Although the Dames Court upheld the power of the President to
settle claims through the mechanism of international executive agree-
ments,73 the opinion never discussed the source of the power to con-
clude such accords. Instead, the Court cited four Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.,74 United States v. Pink, "
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,76 and Haig v. Agee,77 and
30, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Bingham). It should be pointed out, however, that these are the
remarks of the major sponsor of the bill while trying to gain his colleagues' approval after
the Senate rejected a p6rtion of the bill.
71. 453 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted).
72. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1974).
73. See discussion supra note 27.
74. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
75. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
76. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
77. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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discovered implied congressional acquiescence in the presidential use
of executive agreements.7" Because the Constitution contained no ex-
press grant of power to consummate international agreements other
than by the treaty process, the President's power to conclude purely
executive agreements was deemed to be inherent, implied, or
delegated. 9
The text and history of the Constitution are nevertheless instruc-
tive on the nature, if not on the source, of the power exercised by the
Executive in the Algerian Accords. The words "executive agreement"
are not found in the Constitution. 80 Those who believe that no power
not expressly enumerated in the Constitution can be exercised by any
branch of the Federal Government 8 l might well invalidate the Algerian
Accords as an unconstitutional executive use of the treaty power with-
out the advice and consent of the Senate. Few commentators, however,
seriously maintain that the President is limited to purely enumerated
powers. 82 Thus, although executive agreements are not mentioned in
78. For example, the Court held that "failure of Congress specifically to delegate author-
ity does not. . . imply 'congressional disapproval.' "Dames, 453 U.S. at 678 (citation omit-
ted). The Court noted that "Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim
settlement by executive agreement." Id at 680, "'[A] systematic, unbroken executive prac-
tice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned. . . may be
treated as a gloss on "Executive power" vested in the President ... '" Id. at 686 (quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 160-93. Although the Supreme Court has con-
strued the Constitution liberally to recognize, where necessary, the existence of inherent
powers, it is well to keep in mind Justice Jackson's cautionary note in Youngstown: "Loose
and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion of presi-
dential powers. 'Inherent' powers, 'implied' powers, 'incidental' powers, 'plenary' powers,
'war' powers and 'emergency' powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or
ascertainable meanings." 343 U.S. at 646-47 (Jackson, J., concurring).
80. See Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.R. 1, 33
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
81. "[I]t is the unmistakable lesson of history that the President was intentionally given a
few enumerated powers, no more." Id at 25. Berger analyzes in depth the text of the Con-
stitution and the purported intent of the Founders, id at 22-25: "Madison stated in the
Federal Convention that it was essential 'to.fix the extent of the Executive authority' and to
give 'certain powers' to the executive, and that the executive power should be 'confined and
defined.' "Id at 22 (quoting I M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 66-67 (1966)) (emphasis added). The drafters of the Federalist papers also felt that
"ft]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, 237 (J. Madison) (London 1911).
82. "[The federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not
enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text. . . ." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 159 (1978) (construing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))
[hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. Professor Tribe later cites HENKIN, supra note 27, at 68, for the
proposition that "Congress shares in the 'unenumerated foreign affairs power."' TRIBE,
supra, at 166.
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the Constitution, it may well be that the enumerated powers doctrine
does not apply to the field of foreign affairs.8 3 In light of the Founders'
intent to vest the National Government with plenary authority over
foreign affairs, a "sphere properly regarded as one of 'executive'
power,"'8 4 such authority will be implied unless expressly limited by the
Constitution. 5 Constitutional silence on executive agreements may
therefore demonstrate the intent of the Founders to give the President
the very flexibility recognized by the Dames Court.
ii. the treaty clause
One eminent constitutional scholar has observed that "[tihe Con-
stitution expressly prescribes the treaty procedure and nowhere sug-
gests that another method of making international agreements would
do as well."8 6 According to Alexander Hamilton:
[I]t was understood by all to be the intent of the [treaty] provi-
sion to give that power the most ample latitude-to render it
competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies of na-
tional affairs might require; competent to the making of trea-
ties. . . and every other species of convention usual among
nations .. 87
Hamilton further remarked that "it [the treaty power] was . . care-
fully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate, with the
President, [was] required to make any treaty whatever."88 It should be
83. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 31 (footnote omitted); see Rovine, Separation of Powers
and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 412 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Rovine]: "While the Constitution does not specify that the President may enter into such
agreements,. . . the several provisions which together comprise the basis for the foreign
relations power of the President authorize international agreement making.. .."
84. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 159. This may dispose of the supremacy clause problem in
Pink, see infra text accompanying notes 101-24, but it does not solve the problem of the
allocation of power over foreign relations between the two political branches. See infra text
accompanying notes 194-237.
85. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 159. For a discussion of the Curtiss-Wright Court's use of
the inherent powers doctrine in foreign affairs, see infra text accompanying notes 172-75.
86. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 172. He later adds, however, that "the argument that the
Constitution permits international agreements by treaty only was long ago rejected." Id at
421 n.5. The relevant constitutional provision, the treaty clause, provides that the President
"shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present Concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
87. Berger, supra note 80, at 35 (quoting 6 A. HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 183 (H. Lodge ed. 1904)) (emphasis in original).
88. Id Hamilton later changed his views and came to believe that the President should
be accorded greater latitude in foreign affairs. See Berger, supra note 80, at 17-19; E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERs 216 (3d ed. 1948); see also Ohly, Advice and
Consent: International Claims Settlement Agreements, 5 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 271 (1975) [here-
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borne in mind, however, that this was the opinion of but one Founder,
who should not be regarded as the "sole organ" of the Framers' intent
any more than a single individual should be regarded as the "sole or-
gan" of American foreign policyA9
"It was the President. . .who was finally made a participant in
the treaty-making process, which had been initially lodged. . . in the
Senate alone."90 Despite the initial preference shown the Senate, the
"plain language" of the Constitution made the President a full and
equal partner in the treaty-making process and placed this power under
article II, dealing with executive authority, not under article I, dealing
with legislative powers. This may appear to be "infelicitous draftsman-
ship," 91 but it is not a basis for denying the President power which is
expressly granted him.9a On the other hand, making the President an
equal partner is not equivalent to giving him blanket permission to
conclude international agreements solely on his own initiative.
iii. other sources in the Constitution: congressional power
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
inafter cited as Ohly]. Berger goes on to conclude that treaties entirely "preempt the field,"
and that as a result, "the presidential claim to power is clearly eliminated." Berger, suora
note 80, at 36 (construing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring)). Berger
takes Jackson's remarks out of context, however, and inappropriately uses Congress' refusal
to authorize President Truman to seize steel mills to bolster his assertion that the Consltu-
tion, as interpreted by a single Founder, did not sanction the use of any mechanism other
than treaties. Berger bases his claim of original constitutional intent solely on the interpreta-
tion of Hamilton.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 176-78.
90. See Berger, supra note 80, at 10-11; see also Ohly, supra note 88, at 282 n.15.
91. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
92. As a curious sidelight, Rovine, a legal adviser for the State Department, analyzes the
differences between treaties and executive agreements in a manner which might render the
Algerian Accords a treaty, at least for international law purposes. After initially stating that
"[flor purposes of international law, there is no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements," Rovine, supra note 83, at 402, he adds that "[tihe most fundamental require-
ment [for an international agreement] is that the parties intend their undertaking to be le-
gally binding and to be governed by international law." Id at 403. However, an instrument
silent on controlling law is presumably governed by international law. Id The Algerian
Accords made no mention of governing law, nor has there been a claim that they were not
intended to be legally binding. Under Rovine's analysis, therefore, the Algerian Accords
constitute an international agreement, which, under international law, is equivalent to a
treaty. This might make them invalid without the advice and consent of the Senate were it
not for the fact that "domestic law distinctions. . . remain legally valid under United States
law." Id at 402. Domestic law, of course, includes judicial, if not constitutional, approval of
executive agreements without Senate participation. See infra text accompanying notes 108-
09.
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merce with foreign Nations."93 In Gibbons v. Ogden,94 the Supreme
Court defined commerce as "the commercial intercourse between na-
tions, and parts of nations, in all its branches.19 5 Significantly, "the
power over commerce with foreign nations. . is vested in Congress
... absolutely."96
The important issue here is whether the congressional power to
regulate foreign commerce extends to the assets involved in Dames,
and if so, whether the absolute power of Congress precludes presiden-
tial action through executive agreement. The Supreme Court has held
that the congressional power to regulate international commerce in-
eludes every species of commercial intercourse. 97 If commerce is con-
sidered "'[t]he exchange of goods, productions, or property of any
kind,' "98 Congress could clearly pass legislation affecting the disposi-
tion of the assets in Dames.
The Gibbons Court recognized exclusive power in Congress with
respect to a purely interstate claim. In the area of "commerce with
foreign nations, " however, a modern Court might recognize concurrent,
rather than exclusive, power in either of the branches charged with the
foreign relations power. The issue would not be permitting the Presi-
dent to act in an area of otherwise exclusive congressional competence,
but allowing or disallowing Congress to act in what might otherwise be
an exclusively executive domain.99 Because the Dames Court found
that the Congress had acted through the adoption of the IEEPA and
the International Claims Settlement Act (ICSA), it held that the Presi-
dent had not usurped Congress' commerce clause power in concluding
the executive agreement. The Chief Executive was merely acting pursu-
ant to a legislative delegation of power."
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
94. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
95. Id at 189-90.
96. Id at 197; see Ohly, supra note 88, at 275 n.25.
97. Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933) (Congress held to have
exclusive power to regulate taxes paid by state instrumentalities on foreign imports).
98. Anderson v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 226 Ga. 252, 174 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1970) (quot-
ing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 336-37 (4th ed. 1968)).
99. "The ... objection ... that a matter was within the President's exclusive power
over our foreign relations, was disposed of by the Supreme Court with the statement that:
'The subject was one in which Congress had an interest, and in respect to which it could give
directions by means of a legislative enactment."' Ohly, supra note 88, at 276 (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 1967), cer. denied, 390 U.S. 956,
rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968) (footnote omitted)); see HENKIN,supra note 27, at 95:
"[The President] cannot unilaterally regulate ... commerce with foreign nations ......
100. Another possible source of congressional power is the property clause. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, gives Congress "[plower to dispose of ... Property belonging to the
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iv. other constitutional sources: presidential power of recognition
and United States v. Pink
According to one authority, "constitutional history and clauses
vest in the President virtually plenary power in international rela-
tions."'' To the extent that the President enjoys such plenary power, it
is the history of the Constitution, not its clauses, which recognizes this
power; and this history includes Supreme Court precedents which serve
as the primary authority for the Dames opinion.
The Constitution vests in the President the power to "appoint Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,"' 2 and to "receive Am-
bassadors and other public Ministers."' 3 Although this power was
United States" which might enable it to enact necessary and proper legislation to settle
claims by American nationals against foreign nations. Ohly, supra note 88, at 278-79. Under
the reforms of the IEEPA, however, the assets in Dames could not vest in the United States.
Accordingly, the assets were not "[p]roperty belonging to the United States." See supra text
accompanying notes 57-67.
The other major source of congressional authority relevant to the adoption of interna-
tional agreements, the necessary and proper clause, gives Congress the power "[t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Ohly has suggested
that this clause may allow Congress to "'define and codify the powers of the government as
a whole, including those of the President as its principal officer.'" Ohly, supra note 88, at
274 (quoting S. REp. No. 606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1972)). Although the Supreme
Court would hold otherwise, particularly in the area of foreign relations, this broad congres-
sional power that Ohly suggests might preclude the President from concluding executive
agreements without the express authorization of Congress. That Congress possesses the
"necessary and proper" clause power does not automatically prohibit the President from
authoring executive agreements, however, unless the term "all" laws is considered as a grant
of exclusive authority regardless of the sphere to which these laws are to be applied.
Finally, it is interesting to note that article II, § 2, is an affirmative grant of powers to the
President, with no expressed limitation on what he or she can do within the exercise of those
powers. Article I, §§ 9 and 10, on the other hand, contain multiple express limitations on the
powers of Congress and the states. This dichotomy could well support a theory that the
Founders intended the Executive to be empowered to act in a "quasi-sovereign" fashion
with great freedom in exercising his foreign affairs powers, while the Congress was to be
more limited. The argument that "the colonists' revulsion against the king and the judiciary
found expression in the power given to the Congress, as the legislature, of almost complete
authority in foreign relations and affairs," Forkosch, The United States Constitution and In-
ternationalRelations: Some Powers andLimitations Explored, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 219, 222
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Forkosch], must thus deal with the failure of the Founders to
limit in express terms the power of the Executive in the face of the expressly restricted legis-
lative power.
101. Forkosch, supra note 100, at 231; see HENKIN, supra note 27, at 50: "[TIhe broader
theories and recurrent practice lend support to the view that the President's powers in for-
eign affairs are 'plenary'. . . and that nothing is inherently outside his domain."
102. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
103. Id art. II, § 3.
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considered by Hamilton to be "more a matter of dignity than of author-
ity,''1 4 it has come to serve as the "basis for the authority of the Presi-
dent to recognize foreign governments and to enter into recognition
agreements."' 0 5 This recognition power, judicially implied from the
power to receive ambassadors, has in turn led to a further expansion of
executive authority. United States v. Pink0 6 can be interpreted to
mean that "[tihe recognition power supports the corollary power to
enter into agreements for settling outstanding problems, such as claims,
at the time of recognition."' 7 The Dames Court relied on Pink for the
proposition that "the President does have some measure of power to
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and con-
sent of the Sehate."'10 To the extent that the majority relied on Pink, it
would appear that the Court would agree with one commentator that,
although Pink focused on the recognition by the President of the gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union, "the language of the reasoning of [Pink]
would apply as well to any executive agreement."' 0 9
Pink arose when New York state courts refused to give effect
under state law to the Litvinov assignment," 0° which purported to
dispose of the assets of a pre-Russian revolution insurance company
nationalized upon the accession of the Soviet Government." ' I The case
presented the specific issue of whether, under the supremacy clause," 1
2
a state law could constitutionally supersede an executive agreement set-
tling claims in return for recognition of a foreign government.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, 354 (A. Hamilton) (London 1911); see Berger, supra note
80, at 5; Ohly, supra note 88, at 280-81 (quoting HENKIN, supra note 27, at 41: this power
was considered more "a function rather than a 'power,' a ceremony which in many countries
is performed by a figurehead").
105. Rovine, supra note 83, at 415.
106. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
107. Rovine, supra note 83, at 415.
108. Dames, 453 U.S. at 682.
109. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 185.
110. In exchange for an executive agreement according recognition by the United States
to the Soviet government, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, sent
President Franklin D. Roosevelt a letter on November 16, 1933, assigning to the United
States government all rights to pursue claims for property resulting from the nationalization
of all Russian insurance companies in 1918 and 1919. Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-12.
111. Id at 210-13.
112. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, reads in part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States. . . and all Treaties made. . . under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
. ." The Court in Pink held that "A treaty is a 'Law of the Land' under the supremacy
clause. . . . Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have
a similar dignity." Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
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Like the earlier case of United States v. Belmont,II3 Pink can be
narrowly construed to hold merely that "complete power over interna-
tional affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be
subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several
states."114 The Dames Court, however, broadly construed Pink clearly
to establish the President, and not the Congress, as the primary author-
ity in foreign relations." 5 Thus, the Dames Court concluded that the
"[plower to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of
claims of our nationals. . . certainly is a modest implied power of the
President who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the field
of international relations.' "116
The Court's objective in Pink was to communicate strongly to the
states their absolute impotence in the foreign relations field. Dames,
however, involved no issue of state law or federal preemption.1 7 Ac-
cordingly, Pink is inapplicable to a determination of the extent of presi-
dential authority to use executive agreements without the consent of
Congress. The case thus stands more for the proposition that the states
may not act inconsistently with an executive agreement, than that the
President is allowed to settle American claims without prior congres-
sional advice and consent.1 8 Pink might also be read as authorizing the
President to settle claims unilaterally only where recognition is involped:
"Unless such a power exists, the power of recognition might be
thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the
way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another na-
113. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). In Belmont, the United States sued to recover money deposited
with banker August Belmont by a Russian corporation prior to the Russian revolution. The
Court held that the Litvinov Assignment effectively vested title to the money in the United
States, that the executive agreement was valid without Senate participation, and that foreign
affairs were the exclusive province of the National Government.
114. Id at 331.
115. 453 U.S. at 682-83.
116. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 (quoting Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at 320). See Dames, 453 U.S.
at 682-83, for the Supreme Court's analysis of Pink, and id at 661, for its discussion of
Curtiss- Wright.
117. All of the cases cited by McGreevey, supra note 1, at 388 nn.14-22, and Dames itself
were initially filed in federal court. In none of these cases was there an argument of federal
preemption of a state law. McGreevey raises the issue of possible problems of state law in
reference to the Iranian asset freeze, id. at 435, but these problems were never addressed by
the Supreme Court.
118. Pink should thus be limited to hold that "whatever the division of foreign policy
responsibility within the national government, all such responsibility is reposed at the na-
tional level rather than dispersed among the states and localities." TRIBE, supra note 82, at
172 (emphasis in original). The case does not address the question of the allocation of the
foreign affairs power between the two political branches of the government. See Ohly, supra
note 88, at 282 n.53.
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tion, unless. . . the powers and responsibilities of the President. . . in
the conduct of foreign affairs. . . [are] to be drastically revised."" 9
Dames lacked the elements of state-federal conffict and recogni-
tion.1 20 Nonetheless, the Algerian Accords could be viewed as involv-
ing "the rehabilitation of relations between this country and another
nation,"1 21 in that they led to a termination of the hostage crisis. The
decision clearly involves international relations, "'the one aspect of our
government that from the first has been most generally conceded im-
peratively to demand broad national authority.' 122 To allow foreign
affairs to be conducted expeditiously, the Court will be inclined to find
that the political branches have implicitly agreed on a policy allowing
the President unilateral authority to act in international emergency sit-
uations, which "Congress cannot anticipate and [respond to by] legis-
lat[ing] with regard to every possible action the President may find it
necessary to take. .... 123 The Court clearly prefers such an accom-
modation to creating friction between the political branches by an at-
tempt to delimit the parameters of their authority to act in foreign
affairs.
Even if Pink is limited so that "the not so 'modest implied power'
of the President to enter into such agreements with the tacit consent of
Congress amounts to no more than a concurrent power that Congress
can curtail by statute,"1 24 the Court might well find such congressional
"curtailment" in the adoption of the IEEPA and the ICSA. Any com-
plaint that these statutes work an enhancement, rather than a curtail-
ment, of executive power is another criticism of the legislature's
"infelicitous draftsmanship," which is not sufficient grounds for deny-
ing the Executive the power so clearly granted him.
119. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30; see McGreevey, supra note 1, at 436.
120. McGreevey asserts that "the recognition power was not used during the Iranian cri-
sis," McGreevey, supra note 1, at 436, because the Islamic Republic of Iran succeeded the
Shah's government without need of a formal declaration. He therefore concludes that, al-
though "[t]he Accord may have been part of a 'complicated negotiation to restore normal
relations,' . . . it was not entered into in order to 'remove . . . obstacles to full recogni-
tion."' Id (footnote omitted).
121. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230.
122. Id at 232 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941)).
123. Dames, 453 U.S. at 678. McGreevey, supra note 1. at 436-37, further narrows the
applicability of Pink and Belmont only to situations involving alien claimants and refusals
by state courts to apply the act of state doctrine to foreign decrees, but he cites no language
from either case to support his theory..
124. Berger, supra note 80, at 48 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-39 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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v. other constitutional sources: the President's power as Chief
Executive
The other major arguable source' 25 of presidential power to con-
clude executive agreements stems from the President's status as Chief
Executive'26 and his constitutional obligation to execute the laws.
127
Professor Tribe has observed that attempts to limit this power, based on
the separation of powers and delegation of powers doctrines, have
rarely been successful, and illustrate that "it is only by an extraordinary
triumph of constitutional imagination that the Commander in Chief is
conceived as commanded by law."'
128
The theory which advocates strict limitations on executive power
is closely related to the now generally discredited enumerated powers
doctrine.129 This theory would confine the executive function to "faith-
fully execut[ing] laws necessarily and properly enacted by the Con-
gress."' 30 At the other extreme, one commentator feels that the
executive power clause gives the President broad authority to conclude
executive agreements unilaterally,' 3 ' particularly when Congress has
not intervened.' 32 This scholar even has taken the position that Con-
125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL I (the Commander-in-Chief clause), is another possible
source, available at least in time of war, where under the rationale of Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), executive agreements could be seen as a legitimate exercise of the
war power of the national government, which encompasses every activity related to war and
which affects its progress. Id at 93. In such circumstances, the political branches possess
broad discretion in determining the nature and extent of the national danger and in selecting
the means for resisting it. Id Even in war, however, the President's power as Commander-
in-Chief "would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the Confederacy," THE FEDERAL-
isT No. 69, 352 (A. Hamilton) (London 1911), and might thus not give him authority to
conclude executive agreements. Because the situation in Dames did not involve a declared
war, and because President Carter had invoked provisions of a statute designed to distin-
guish between war and national emergency, which gave him more limited powers in the
latter instance, there is but a weak case supporting use of the Commander-in-Chief clause
under the facts of Dames. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
126. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. I, provides that "ft]he executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the. United States of America."
127. Id art. II, § 3, provides that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."
128. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 157.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85.
130. Ohly, supra note 88, at 284.
131. Rovine, supra note 83, at 413.
132. Id at 414. Although Rovine lists a number of agreements concluded by virtue of this
power, id at 414 n.86, he fails to discuss how the executive power clause has been inter-
preted, and how the separation and delegation of powers problems are involved. Rovine
merely states that "the scope of the President's power to conclude such agreements is a very
difficult question which has not yet been settled." Id at 415.
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gress is impotent to act in the field because it is given no express power
by the Constitution to conclude executive agreements.1
33
Faced with the absence in the Constitution of a grant of such
broad authority, the Dames Court held that the President had not en-
croached on congressional prerogatives in concluding the Algerian Ac-
cords because Congress had both expressly
34 and impliedly 135
approved the steps taken by the President to secure the release of the
American hostages. The Court was unwilling to restrain the Executive
in the "resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our coun-
try and another' 136 and eagerly grasped at some indication of congres-
sional cooperation.
vi. a constitutional source of implied federal power to conclude
international agreements
Article I, section 10, of the Constitution specifically limits state ac-
tion in foreign affairs and is occasionally viewed as a source of implied
national power to conclude international agreements. This section pro-
vides in part that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation,"' 37 and that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of
Congress,. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with. . a for-
eign Power."' 38 These provisions support two arguments. The first ar-
gument is that because these powers are specifically prohibited to the
states, they must reside in the Federal Government.139 Second, the
words "agreement or Compact with a foreign Power" demonstrate the
Framers' recognition of agreements short of treaties. If this power is
denied the states, and if the Federal Government possesses all the nor-
mal powers and functions of a sovereign state, the power to conclude
international agreements necessarily resides in the National Govern-
ment. This argument supports the assertion that to deny the Federal
Government the power to act, where the states are clearly prohibited
133. Id at 423.
134. "Mhe IEEPA constitutes specific congressional authorization to the President to
nullify the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets . " Dames, 453 U.S. at
675.
135. "Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly ap-
proved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement." d at 680.
136. Id at 688.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
138. Id § 10, cl. 3.
139. But id amend. X reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
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from acting, would improperly create a void.140
The contrasting view is that the omission from the treaty clause of
the words "agreement" or "compact" was intentional Under this view,
those who claim that the power to conclude international agreements
resides in the Federal Government must seek authority for such power
solely in the treaty process. Thus, as one commentator has mentioned,
article I, section 10 might show that "the fact that the Framers explicitly
authorized the States to enter into 'agreements' but omitted to do so in
the case of the President implies a deliberate decision to withhold that
power from him."1 4 1 One might well conclude that because the treaty
clause is silent about executive agreements, the power to conclude them
was not granted to the Federal Government. Furthermore, because the
states are prohibited by the tenth amendment from entering into execu-
tive agreements, whatever power does exist to make them resides only
in the people. 142 The Supreme Court, however, most likely will not
construe a clause that is silent on the matter as an implied prohibition
of presidential power to make executive agreements.
b. the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949
The Dames Court, apparently comfortable with the idea of ple-
nary executive power in foreign affairs, sanctioned the President's at-
tachment of Iranian assets by finding congressional cooperation.
Whereas the IEEPA gave the President express authority to attach the
assets, the Court determined that the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949 (ICSA) 43 gave him the implied power to use executive
agreements to dispose of them. 44
The Court acknowledged that the ICSA was intended to create a
commission in the State Department to disburse to American claimants
funds received through executive agreements with foreign countries.
45
The Court held that this rather limited purpose evidenced congres-
140. "'For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,
embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one
power."' TRIBE, supra note 82, at 172 (quoting Chae Chin Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 606 (1889)).
141. Berger, supra note 80, at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
143. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1644m (1976).
144. Dames, 453 U.S. at 680.
145. Initially, the statute dealt with procedures for distributing funds obtained through an
executive agreement with Yugoslavia in 1948, but it was later amended to allow for dis-
bursement of funds received through settlements with the People's Republic of China, East
Germany, and Viet Nam. See id. at 680-8 1. It should be noted that each time a new country
was to be included, specific congressional action was necessary. This indicates a desire by
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sional intent to approve the use of executive agreements themselves. 146
The majority opinion cited legislative history and concluded that
"Congress did not question the fact of the settlement [of claims by ex-
ecutive agreement] or the power of the President to have concluded
it.' 47 In fact, however, the legislative history is generally silent on the
President's power to utilize executive agreements. It is much more con-
cerned with how to allocate funds received through settlements than
with the process by which these funds are appropriated. The statute
thus offers little help in determining whether Congress has impliedly
acquiesced in the use of executive agreements.
The ICSA offers some insight into congressional intent. Origi-
nally, the three members of the claims commission "were made subject
to appointment by the Secretary of State rather than subject to Presi-
dential appointment with Senatorial confirmation."' 14 The House ver-
sion was changed by the Senate "[to] provid[e] that the members of the
Commission be appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate."' 149 This change, which was ultimately adopted, clearly
illustrates that Congress was not passively acquiescing in a unilateral
executive role in the claims settlement procedure. Accordingly, this
statute may be inappropriate to prove "the history of acquiescence in
executive claims settlement."'1
50
The text of the ICSA discloses clearly that it was intended to apply
in situations far different from that involved in Dames:
The Commission shall have jurisdiction to receive, ex-
amine, adjudicate, and render final decisions with respect to
claims of the Government of the United States and of nation-
als of the United States. . .included within the terms of any
claims agreement. . . concluded between the Government of
the United States and a foreign government. . . arising out of
the nationalization or other taking ofproperty, by the agree-
ment of the Government of the United States to accept from
that government a sum in en bloc settlement thereof.'5'
The legislative history confirms the Act's purpose, viz., to dis-
Congress not to leave this matter entirely in the hands of the President, thus refuting some-
what the theory of implied congressional acquiescence.
146. "By creating a procedure to implement future settlement agreements, Congress
placed its stamp of approval on such agreements." Id at 680.
147. Id at 681.
148. H.R. REP. No. 770, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
149. S. REP. No. 800, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
150. Dames 453 U.S. at 686.
151. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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charge American claims "in full settlement for American property na-
tionalized or otherwise taken over by [a foreign government]."
15 2
Under a typical application of the Act, the "[i]nterposition by the
[United States] Government in behalf of claimant Americans is obvi-
ously necessary. If such interposition were not made, the American
whose position and interest are prejudiced by the acquisitive action of a
foreign government would have recourse to local courts as his only op-
portunity for relief.'
153
Congress' supposition that under these circumstances a claimant
would be delighted with executive action, because in its absence "this
[recourse to local courts] would amount to no relief at all,"' 54 simply
does not apply in Dames. First, Dames involved no issue of nationali-
zation: Dames and Moore sued under a contract for services, not for
an accounting of property expropriated by Iran. Furthermore, there
was no need for United States Government intervention because Ira-
nian assets sufficient to cover Dames and Moore's claim were already
in the United States and subject to attachment. In short, Dames did not
involve a situation where, if the Government did not interfere, the
claimant would receive nothing; to the contrary, as a result of the Gov-
ernment's action-sanctioned by the Supreme Court-the claimant
may receive nothing, or at least substantially less than he or she might
otherwise have received had the judicial process at the district court
level been allowed to stand.
Ironically, Dames places a claimant who initially was in a position
substantially superior to that of the contemplated ICSA claimant in, at
best, a position on a level with the ICSA claimant: his judicially pro-
tected claim must now be pressed before a claims commission. The
Dames plaintiff may indeed be in a worse position than an ICSA peti-
tioner because he or she is by no means assured of enjoying as sympa-
thetic a hearing from an international arbitral tribunal as from a State
Department commission.'55 The ICSA should not be construed as an
implied authorization for the President to conclude executive agree-
ments arising out of circumstances so dissimilar to those which the Act
was intended to remedy.
Nevertheless, references in the Congressional Record do illustrate
that Congress recognized executive prerogative in the claims settlement
152. H.R. REP. No. 770, supra note 148, at 2.
153. Id at 3-4; see S. REP. No. 800, supra note 149, at 3.
154. H.R. RFp. No. 770, supra note 148, at 4.
155. For the composition and operations of the International Arbitral Tribunal, see the
second Algerian Accord, reprinted in McGreevey, supra note 1, at 452-54.
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arena. One congressman stated that "it is the executive and not the
Congress which has primary power in the conduct of foreign
relations." 156
The assurance derived from an express grant of authority is absent
in considering the ICSA. The authority for unilateral executive agree-
ments that the Court inferred from a reading of the ICSA and its legis-
lative history may entail a shift into Justice Jackson's "zone of
twilight." 157 Under Justice Jackson's analysis, therefore, the Dames
Court, in finding authority for the President's unilateral international
agreements, was confronted with a situation where the extent of presi-
dential power sanctioned by the Court depended more on the exigen-
cies of a particular emergency than on the terms of an express
provision."' Responding to this dilemma, the Court in Dames resorted
to its ultimate rationale: "[Clongressional inertia, indifference or quies-
cence may sometimes... enable, if not invite, measures on independ-
ent presidential responsibility." 59 The Court was ready to navigate the
perilous waters of delegation of powers, buoyed up by the singular case
of Curtiss- Wright.
2. Delegation of powers problems and United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.
The Dames Court reasoned that the "failure of Congress specifi-
cally to delegate authority does not, 'especially. . .in the areas of for-
eign policy and national security,' imply 'congressional disapproval' of
action taken by the Executive."' 60 Furthermore, in holding that " 'long-
156. 95 CONG. REc. 8837 (1949). The Congressional Record also reveals that Congress
cannot bind the President on the substance of future foreign claims agreements because such
agreements are not within the enumerated constitutional powers of Congress. Id Another
congressman acknowledged that the Framers of the Constitution wisely gave the executive
branch discretion in the field of claims settlements. Id at 8847. One member lamented that
"the Congress of the United States continually bows to the State Department on every ques-
tion that they raise," id at 8851, and another felt that Congress should prevent "such high-
handed [executive] action." Id. at 8845. The majority of the members of Congress, how-
ever, recognized the power of the executive to settle claims against foreign countries. Id at
8840. It is interesting to note what one member felt to be the constitutional authority for
such a broad executive power. "From the time of John Marshall right down to the recent
Curtiss-Wright case the courts have held that agreements of this kind are the function of the
executive department of the United States and you cannot take it away from them." 96
CONG. REC. 2969 (1950); see infra text accompanying notes 160-93.
157. See supra note 30.
158. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). For Justice Jackson's
discussion of the "zone of twilight," see supra note 30.
159. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Dames, 453 U.S. at 678.
160. 453 U.S. at 678 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 291).
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continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would
raise a presumption that the [action] has been [taken] in pursuance of
its consent,' "161 the Court virtually created a rule of customary consti-
tutional law permitting Congress to delegate to the President, over
time, the power to settle the claims of American nationals by executive
agreement. This delegation need not be express: Congress may "implic-
itly [approve] the practice of claim settlement by executive agree-
ment."' 162 By allowing the delegation of power from one branch of
government to another through implication alone, Dames broadened
the Curtiss- Wright Court's holding that the prohibition against delega-
tions by one branch to another does not apply to foreign affairs.
1 63
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 11 the defendant
munitions manufacturer had conspired to sell American machine guns
to Bolivia, which was then fighting in the Chaco. 165 The conspiracy
began the day after Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the
President to ban the sale of arms to Bolivia if, in his discretion, he
determined that peace might result from such a prohibition. 66 The res-
olution provided that it would be unlawful to conclude any sales once
the President issued a ban on such transactions.' 67 Pursuant to the au-
thority granted him by the resolution, President Roosevelt issued a pro-
hibitory proclamation, 16 and the defendants were indicted for its
violation. In its defense, Curtiss-Wright contended that the joint resolu-
tion was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Ex-
ecutive.' 69 Curtiss-Wright reasoned that the language of the resolution
made criminal the violation of the executive proclamation, rather than
the violation of the congressional resolution. According to this theory,
this language effectively converted the proclamation into a law, which
only Congress could constitutionally enact. The Curtiss-Wright Court
rejected this contention and held the delegation valid.170 The Court
proceeded to analyze the source of the foreign affairs power and how it
was allocated among the branches of the Federal Government. 71 In
searching for a rationale for broad executive power in foreign affairs,
161. 453 U.S. at 686 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915)).
162. 453 U.S. at 680.
163. See HENKIN, supra note 27, at 32.
164. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
165. Id at 311.
166. Id at 311-12.
167. Id
168. Id at 312-13.
169. Id at 314.
170. Id at 322.
171. See T~aiB, supra note 82, at 159 (footnote omitted).
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the Court held that the President's powers were not exhausted by the
enumerated powers doctrine because enumerated powers were only
those delegated by the states, acting severally, to the Federal Govern-
ment. 72 The foreign affairs power, on the other hand, originated else-
where as a direct "grant" of sovereign power from the Crown to the
states collectively.' 73 Because the power was collective, it devolved
upon the Federal Government as a whole upon its establishment. As a
result, the President was not deprived of inherent authority to act in
foreign affairs. Nor was the President restricted by the express language
of the Constitution'74 although, of course, his conduct had to conform
to constitutional standards.1
7 5
Because of the extra-constitutional derivation of the foreign affairs
power, the Curtiss-Wright Court allocated its exercise in a way which
might have violated the separation of powers and checks and balances
doctrines had the subject been purely domestic. The Court held that
because "'[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,' ,,176 he could
exercise greater discretion in international than in national affairs.
177
The Dames Court recognized the power of the "sole organ" theory in
legitimating unilateral presidential action in foreign affairs, while it ac-
knowledged the reluctance of the Youngstown Court to extend such
substantial power to the domestic arena.
178
Although the Court in Curtiss- Wright never mentioned the origins
of the "sole organ" concept, the theory was merely intended by its au-
thor, John Marshall, as an acknowledgment that the President is the
sole means of communication with other nations, not the sole formula-
172. 299 U.S. at 316.
173. Id at 316-17. Berger contends that the foreign affairs power was derived from the
states severally, rather than collectively, and then delegated to the Federal Government,
thus binding the President to the exercise of enumerated powers only. He noted that the
Articles of Confederation of 1777 expressly granted the power to make treaties to "[t]he
United States in Congress assembled," and that the states had severally agreed to enter into a
league of friendship. Berger, supra note 80, at 29 (emphasis added). According to Berger,
therefore, Justice Sutherland's theory that enumerated powers consisted only of those pos-
sessed severally by the states prior to the Constitution, see Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316,
would include the foreign affairs power. As a result, the President could only exercise enu-
merated, not inherent, power in this field.
174. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
175. See id at 319.
176. Id (quoting then Representative John Marshall in 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613
(1851)).
177. 299 U.S. at 320.
178. 453 U.S. at 661-62. See infra text accompanying notes 194-238 for a discussion of
Youngstown.
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tor of foreign policy.'79 The President was merely granted the power to
speak on behalf of the nation. The Curtiss- Wright Court, however, con-
strued the theory as giving the President substantive power to conclude
international agreements on his own. 18° The Court thus virtually sanc-
tioned the power of the President to ignore the treaty process and bind
the United States domestically and internationally through mere use of
his inherent powers. To the extent ttiat Dames relies on Curtiss-
Wright, the sole organ may well have drowned out the players in the
congressional orchestra.' 82
The Dames Court rejected the executive branch's theory that the
absence of express power in Congress to conclude international agree-
ments unilaterally precluded Congress from delegating such power to
the President."3 The Court held that Congress actually had delegated
this authority by implication alone. Although the Court thus acknowl-
edged the foreign affairs power as concurrent, 184it refrained from de-
termining the allocation of this power between the political branches
and from disabling the Executive from acting on his or her sole initia-
tive. 1 5 Although one commentator notes that all presidential power,
including that over foreign affairs, was originally a derogation from
179. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 300 n.18. Henkin also refers to a letter by Thomas Jeffer-
son describing the President as "the only channel of communication between this country
and foreign nations... "Id (quoting 6 T. JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 451 (P. Ford ed. 1895));
see Berger, supra note 80, at 17; TRiBE, supra note 82, at 164 n.4.
180. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 300 n.18.
181. Ohly, supra note 88, at 285.
182. The debate over Justice Sutherland's famous pronouncements on the powers of the
President in foreign affairs will probably continue for some time. Compare HENKIN, supra
note 27, at 32: "Delegations by Congress to the President have been extensive and constant
and Curtiss-Wright tells us that in foreign affairs the principle of separation [of powers] does
not bar them," with Forkosch, supra note 100, at 234 n.87: "This case [Curis-Wright] 'con-
tains a famous though now rejected dictum that the rule against the delegation of legislative
power does not apply in foreign affairs."' (quoting Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War
Power..4 Critique, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 623, 685 (1972)).
183. Rovine, supra note 83, at 423; see HENKiN, supra note 27, at 174: "Congress, also,
has no authority to negotiate with foreign governments: it cannot, then, delegate any to the
President."; Forkosch, supra note 100, at 244 n.129. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 285, refers to
cases in which delegation is not possible: "[Certain congressional powers are simply not
delegable - as when it is clear from the language of the Constitution that the purposes under-
lying certain powers would not be served if Congress delegated its responsibility." The
Dames Court held that in the Iranian case "the purposes" were served.
184. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331 (1934).
185. See Berger, supra note 80, at 45; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 603-04 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Ohly, supra note 88, at 285: "The Court [in Curtiss- Wright] properly
noted that if such 'inherent power' exists. . . it was 'vested in the federal government' and
not in any individual branch thereof." (footnotes omitted).
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congressional power,t 16 he concedes that today there are virtually no
limitations on the powers which can be delegated.'87
Although ostensibly "the Court 'narrowly construes' federal stat-
utes to avoid broad delegations,"' 88 the Dames Court's finding of con-
gressional approval in the working of executive agreements, through
inertia and acquiescence, further adds to "Itihe murkiness of the judi-
cial waters [and enables] the determined executive branch to accom-
plish what it otherwise might be unable to do .. ."189 The decision in
Dames will nonetheless cause little damage if, in a future case, the
Court agrees that "delegations do not result in transfers of power but
only in utilizations as granted and limited temporarily." 190 There is lit-
tle threat to the Constitution if the Supreme Court holds that only in
extraordinary circumstances will Congress be found to have delegated
power and that that power can always be recalled.19'
Danger lies ahead if Dames is interpreted as holding that the Pres-
ident is empowered to act unilaterally without the consent of Con-
gress.192 This is unlikely to happen if the Court remains mindful that
"'[a]n agent [the President] cannot new model his own commis-
sion' "193 and recognizes that the branches of government can remain
separate and still survive any valid presidential need to respond flexibly
to a national emergency.
3. Separation of powers problems and Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'94 arose when, to avert a
nationwide strike of steelworkers during the Korean War, President
Truman issued an executive order authorizing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize most of the country's steel mills and keep them run-
ning. 9 ' The Secretary ordered the presidents of the seized companies
to continue in operation on behalf of the United States. 196 Because the
President believed that national defense and the war effort gave him
186. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 33.
187. Id at 120.
188. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 289.
189. Forkosch, supra note 100, at 269.
190: Id at 270.
191. Id
192. Berger, supra note 80, at 53.
193. 11 at 54 (quoting 6 A. HAMILTON, THE WoRKs OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 166 (H.
Lodge ed. 1904)) (emphasis deleted).
194. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
195. Id at 583.
196. Id
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inherent emergency authority to take extraordinary measures, he acted
without consulting Congress. 197 The steel companies filed suit, com-
plaining that the seizures were neither congressionally authorized nor
within the constitutional powers of the President. The Government re-
sponded by arguing that the President had "inherent power" to accom-
plish the seizure. 198
The Youngstown Court ruled the seizures unlawful, holding that
they were not within the President's constitutional power.199 In this
seminal case, the Supreme Court Justices expounded at great length on
the separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature.
The same problems presented in Youngstown are certain to arise if
Dames is applied to future emergencies. The majority in Youngstown,
through Justice Black, dismissed the Government's inherent powers
theory, and found that Congress had patently rejected the idea that the
Executive could seize domestic property in emergency situations.20 0
Justice Black explained that neither the President's authority as Com-
mander-in-Chief nor his authority to execute the laws gave him "the
ultimate power. . . to take possession of private property in order to
keep labor disputes from stopping production."'20 ' The Court empha-
sized two points critical to an analysis of Dames. First, "[i]n the frame-
work of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker, '20 2 this
legislative function being the exclusive province of Congress. Second,
even if prior Presidents had seized private property without congres-
sional consent, Congress, nonetheless, remained the sole lawmaker.0 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter declared that mere
recognition that power is national in scope does not work an automatic
197. Id
198. Id at 584.
199. Id at 586-89.
200. Id at 586. To the extent that Youngstown may be read as a limitation on the Presi-
dent's power to seize property during wartime, it should operate as a severe limitation on the
power of the President to do as he or she pleases with property during "mere" national
emergencies of the type in Dames, even though Youngstown dealt with domestic property
and Dames with foreign assets. The Dames Court avoided this conflict with Youngstown by
holding that the revocable license to attach did not give the petitioners any property rights in
the assets; the assets thus did not constitute "domestic" property. 453 U.S. at 674 n.6. In
addition, by virtue of the changes from the TWEA adopted in the IEEPA, the President was
not seizing property and placing it under executive branch control, but merely "disposing"
of it. Id at 672 n.5.
201. 343 U.S. at 587.
202. Id
203. Id at 588-89.
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allocation of it. to either the President or Congress.2° He then ad-
dressed the problem of what inferences may properly be drawn from
congressional silence on a given issue. He stated: "[A] systematic, un-
broken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Con-
gress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents. . . may
be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President
"205
Justice Douglas believed that all lawmaking power resided in
Congress alone.2"6 He warned that "[i]f we sanctioned the present exer-
cise of power by the President, we would be expanding Article II of the
Constitution and rewriting it to suit the political conveniences of the
present emergency. ' 20 7 He concluded that the President's power to exe-
cute the laws was limited to those laws which Congress enacted.208
Justice Jackson felt that the executive branch possessed only dele-
gated powers, which, however, should be broadly construed.20 9 He was,
therefore, unimpressed at the Government's attempt to use nebulous
inherent powers resulting from the practice of previous administrations
as justification for President Truman's seizure of the steel mills. 210 Al-
though Justice Jackson acknowledged that Congress could delegate ex-
traordinary emergency power in times of crisis,2 " he stressed that,
nevertheless, "emergency powers are consistent with free government
only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who
exercises them.
' 2 12
The Dames Court utilized the Youngstown analysis to give "the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpreta-
tion"213 to the Executive's action, because it found that the President
had acted pursuant to specific legislative authorization.214 Although
this conclusion might legitimately apply to the IEEPA, Congress had
not expressly approved of executive agreements. Furthermore, because
Congress is the sole lawmaker and international agreements have been
204. Id at 603-04 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
205. Id at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
206. Id at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
207. Id at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
208. Id at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
209. Id at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
210. Id at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring).
211. Id at 652 (Jackson, J., concurring).
212. Id (Jackson, J., concurring).
213. Dames, 453 U.S. at 674 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
214. 453 U.S. at 675.
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accorded the same legal status as treaties, 21 -5 an executive agreement is
in effect an act of legislation. Additionally, it has never been held that
the President's foreign affairs power enables him to issue orders having
the force of law where they directly regulate property within the United
States; 216 this is peculiarly the role reserved for Congress. Unless the
separation of powers problems discussed in Youngstown are limited to
presidential usurpations of domestic lawmaking authority in the ab-
sence of congressional delegation, Dames may involve some executive
encroachment on legislative powers.
The Dames Court encountered further difficulties in relying upon
Youngstown as authority for the holding that Congress' knowing acqui-
escence in past presidential actions implied approval of the Algerian
Accords.2 17 Because "usage has long been regarded as an inadequate
source of constitutional authority, ' 218 a history of presidential action in
the face of congressional inertia is insufficient authority for the creation
of a customary constitutional rule of law, and a failure by Congress to
exercise its acknowledged powers does not enable another branch not
granted those powers to act in its place.21 9 To put the matter simply,
Congress' failure to utilize its concurrent foreign affairs power does not
automatically sanction unilateral presidential decisions.2
In addition, the notion that executive agreements are a practice
which Congress has never questioned is erroneous. To the contrary,
Congress has repeatedly protested against such exercises of executive
power. For example, the Senate believed that the Rush-Bagot Agree-
ment of 1817 should have been consummated through the treaty pro-
cess.22 In addition, the Senate in 1972 voted eighty-one to zero for the
Case Bill, which would have required congressional input into the pro-
cess of making international agreements. 222 There has thus developed a
continuing struggle between Congress and the President over the lat-
ter's capacity to conclude such accords without legislative approval. 23
215. Pink, 315 U.S. at 230; see Berger, supra note 80, at 48, however: "Article VI...
makes only 'Laws' and 'Treaties' the 'supreme law of the land', binding upon the states. It
would require a constitutional amendment. . . to make an executive agreement, concluded
by the President alone, equally binding." (footnote omitted).
216. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 57.
217. 453 U.S. at 686.
218. Ohly, supra note 88, at 286.
219. Forkosch, supra note 100, at 246 n.138.
220. See Dames, 453 U.S. at 678, for the Court's theory that congressional inertia in for-
eign affairs does enable the President to act independently.
221. Rovine, supra note 83, at 411.
222. Berger, supra note 80, at 3 (footnotes omitted).
223. Rovine, supra note 83, at 397. Rovie devotes four pages, 397-401, to discussing
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Indeed, Congress "has especially resented Presidentialfais accomplis
committing the U.S. before the world and compelling Congress to rub-
ber-stamp his initiatives." '224 Although, in the Iranian hostages affair,
Congress seemed quite content to serve as a "rubber-stamp" by voicing
no disapproval of the Algerian agreements, 2 5 it has nonetheless repeat-
edly expressed its dissatisfaction with executive agreements in general.
Because Dames did not involve express congressional approval of
executive agreements, the Dames Court discarded Justice Jackson's tri-
partite analysis in that part of the opinion dealing with their constitu-
tionality. The Court did find, however, that Congress' failure to enact a
statute expressing disapproval was equivalent to an invitation to the
President to act on his own.226 In Dames congressional silence was held
equivalent to approval of presidential initiatives, whereas in Youngs-
town the Court refused to imply approval from Congress' failure to
grant President Truman the power he was seeking. In holding that the
ICSA showed implied congressional approval of claims settlements by
executive agreement,227 where neither the express language of the stat-
ute nor its legislative history sanctioned executive agreements, the
Dames Court virtually found "secreted in the interstices of legislation
the very grant of power which Congress consciously withheld. 228
That approval of executive agreements was consciously withheld is
evident from the long history of congressional efforts to exert control
over the international agreement process.2 29 The ICSA is inappropriate
authority for a contrary finding. Congress is on record as expressing as
much dissatisfaction with the executive agreement method of reaching
international accord as with the assertion of presidential power to seize
property which was at issue in Youngstown. Youngstown therefore
stands for the proposition that the absence in a statute of an express
grant of power to the President may not be used to create that power
implicitly. Thus, the ICSA's silence on executive agreements does not
imply approval of such agreements. Given the history of congressional
protest, the President's use of executive agreements may well be incom-
Senate unhappiness with executive use of solo international agreements. See HENKIN, supra
note 27, at 179.
224. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 91.
225. 453 U.S. at 687-88.
226. See id at 678 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
227. 453 U.S. at 680.
228. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see supra text accompany-
ing notes 144-59.
229. Seesupra text accompanying notes 221-25. But see Dames, 453 U.S. at 682 n.10, for
the theory that Congress deliberately refrained from exercising supervisory controls over
executive agreements.
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patible with Congress' implied will, thus placing his power "at its low-
est ebb."'230
Nevertheless, the Youngstown Court never questioned the Presi-
dent's ability to rely on his own independent constitutional powers.23'
The Dames Court believed that the President possessed sufficient
power, whether express or implied, to act in the Iranian crisis because
the crisis involved foreign affairs. By contrast, the domestic issues in-
volved in Youngstown did not fall within the scope of the Executive's
independent authority. The powers disputed in Dames were concur-
rent. Where it is understood that power is to be shared concurrently,
the President's authority to act, unpalatable though it may be to some
senators, will go unquestioned by the courts.232
Because Youngstown involved domestic policy, Congress had ex-
clusive authority to make the laws; thus, the President did not possess
unchecked discretion to act in the domestic arena, even in furtherance
of international military policy.233 If Youngstown is limited only to do-
mestic situations, however, its utility as a restriction on presidential
power in foreign affairs is minimal since the opinion does not directly
address the question of whether the President may possess inherent
powers in the international arena.
3 4
Applying Youngstown's separation of powers theories to the area
of foreign policy and international agreements leads to paradox. On the
one hand, allowing the branch which is to execute the laws the power
to conclude international agreements, which are admittedly laws of the
land, gives the President a legislative function which is clearly uncon-
stitutional.3 5 On the other hand, the Senate Subcommittee on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee determined in 1973
that the Executive possessed the power both to conclude international
negotiations and to choose the instrument for their conclusion.236 Giv-
230. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638-39 (Jackson, J., concurring). See supra note 30 for dis-
cussion of Justice Jackson's theory of the interplay between presidential and congressional
power.
231. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
232. See Forkosch, suara note 100, at 229: "In the field of foreign relations ... 'the
power to determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided power,
with the lion's share falling usually to the President, though by no means always.' " (quoting
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 308 (3d ed. 1948)) (emphasis in original).
233. TRIBE, supra note 82, at 181.
234. Id at 182.
235. Berger, supra note 80, at 23 n.127.
236. Rovine, supra note 83, at 429 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 6 (Comm. Print 1973)).
[Vol. 15
DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN
ing the Executive such untrammeled authority flies in the face of the
protest expressed by one Founder that "[i]n theory this is an absurdity -
in practice a tyranny.''11 7 Those concerned about the expansion of pres-
idential power can only hope that Dames will do little more than add to
the "century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation
yield[ing] no net result but only supply[ing] more or less apt quotations
from respected sources on each side of any question. They largely can-
cel each other. '2
38
4. Public policy rationales for the legitimacy of executive
agreements
Although the text of the Constitution does not authorize the con-
clusion of executive agreements, there exist compelling public policy
reasons why the Algerian Accords in particular should be honored,
given the unique facts out of which the Dames opinion arose. It is not
the thesis of this note that public policy considerations are alone suffi-
cient to render constitutional otherwise unsanctioned executive actions;
nevertheless, the political exigencies of the Iranian hostage crisis indi-
cate that the Dames decision was at least correct politically, if not
constitutionally.
In the past, the Court has not hesitated to utilize political grounds
as aids in its decisions, particularly in nationally-perceived emergen-
cies. The Curtiss-Wright Court, for instance, acknowledged that in for-
eign affairs the President possessed far broader powers than in the
domestic field because of the "important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems"" associated with foreign relations. The Pink
Court also felt that the President must be accorded the implied power
to settle claims in order effectively to "handl[e] the delicate problems of
foreign relations. ' '240 Although Justice Jackson cautioned against the
"ready pretext for usurpation"24' of power by the Executive which
emergencies afford, the Court has been inclined to give the President
broad power in such situations, based more on political than constitu-
tional considerations.
The Dames Court recognized that the claims settlement agreement
at issue was necessary to the resolution of a major foreign policy dis-
237. Berger, supra note 80, at 23 n.127 (quoting 6 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 145 (G. Hunt ed. 1906)).
238. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
239. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
240. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229.
241. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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pute242 and acknowledged that its decision was "one more episode in
the never-ending tension between the President exercising the executive
authority in a world that presents each day some new challenge with
which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live. 243
The Court also recognized that Dames involved an international crisis,
"the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to antici-
pate in any detail."2" The Court thus adopted a public policy rationale
invalidating efforts by individual claimants to upset the results of time-
consuming, delicate negotiations involving the safety of American citi-
zens. The Court was plainly reluctant to allow any impairment of the
value of the President's major bargaining chip in dealing with the un-
stable Iranian situation.245 It resolved the tension between the President
and the Constitution in favor of the Executive, at the expense of strict
constitutional doctrine.
Other rationales besides the "bargaining chip" theory have been
offered to legitimate executive agreements. Political considerations, in-
cluding the relationship between this cpuntry and its negotiating coun-
terpart,246 are important. The volatile Iranian negotiations, which
extended over a period of fourteen months and which were subject to
alternating advances and reversals based on both executive and legisla-
tive whim in Iran and the United States, illustrate the need to be sensi-
tive to the exigencies of international politics.
The need to act swiftly was another important political considera-
tion.247 It would have been unthinkable, after the numerous snags to a
resolution of the Iranian crisis had been removed, to have risked fur-
ther delays or collapse of the agreement by subjecting it to the time-
consuming and often divisive process of treaty creation and ratification.
The unpredictability of the Iranian situation further underscored the
need to rely on the secrecy of the President,248 rather than have sensi-
tive negotiations over sharp antagonisms opened up to public debate.
242. Dames, 453 U.S. at 688.
243. Id at 662.
244. Id at 669.
245. Id at 673-74. "The frozen assets serve as a 'bargaining chip' to be used by the Presi-
dent when dealing with a hostile country." Id at 673; see H.R. Rm,. No. 915, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1980), which acknowledged the practice of the Government to block foreign assets to
offset anticipated claims against the foreign country. There is no requirement that these
claims be economic rather than political, and thus no reason why blocked assets cannot
serve as bargaining chips for lives.
246. Rovine, supra note 83, at 419.
247. Id
248. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, 329 (J. Jay) (London 1911). Berger, supra note 80, at 11, is
unimpressed with the secrecy rationale.
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Additionally, because other countries turn naturally to the Presi-
dent when this country has allegedly violated their rights,249 they be-
lieve that a commitment by the President through executive agreement
is the act of an "authorized agent" which will be honored by the other
branches of the Government 0 and by the nation as a whole. This reli-
ance may "estop" the Congress, unless it makes clear to the world that
it is definitively entering the field, from negating executive agreements
entered into in good faith by countries expecting the President's word
to be respected. If Congress truly objects to an exercise of presidential
power which it feels it should share, it must make its objection clear.
Only Congress can prevent its losing its acknowledged power to legis-
late for emergencies."5 Finally, the President must be able to respond
flexibly to unforeseen circumstances, a category into which the Iranian
crisis clearly fell.1
2
Other factors, unique to the Iranian hostage crisis, militate equally
as strongly for approval of the Algerian Accords. Although most im-
portant agreements will be treaties rather than executive agreements,
253
the clear need for swift, unilateral executive action in the Iranian crisis
made use of the latter particularly appropriate. Congress was kept in-
formed, by both the outgoing Carter administration and the incoming
Reagan administration, of all stages of the final negotiations. Nothing
could have prevented Congress from acting had it so desired, and its
silence at that particular time showed that in the hostage crisis Con-
gress intentionaly refrained from registering its characteristic objec-
tions to executive agreements.- 4
Entirely peculiar to the situation in Dames was the necessity to
conclude an agreement before the end of the Carter administration.
This necessity arose, not because of the now-rejected theory that execu-
tive agreements expire at the end of the administration concluding
249. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 49 (footnote omitted).
250. The Supreme Court, in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), ordered dismissed
a challenge by certain senators to deny effect to President Carter's unilateral abrogation of
the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, since they had failed to show that they had been
injured by the presidential action. Although lower courts had exhaustively argued about the
power of the President to render inoperative a congressionally-approved treaty without Con-
gress' consent, the high Court avoided deciding this issue by holding that the case was not
ripe.
251. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
252. TmiB, supra note 82, at 160.
253. Rovine, supra note 83, at 418.
254. Dames, 453 U.S. at 688 n.13.
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them, 25 5 but because it was uncertain that the succeeding Republican
administration would adopt an agreement with which it was dissatis-
fied.256 Finally, the Dames Court was well aware of the volatility of the
Iranian crisis and was sensitive to the fact that President Carter, al-
though occasionally criticized, enjoyed widespread popular, national
backing for his actions in resolving the hostage stalemate. It would
have been impolitic for Congress or the Court to have ignored the na-
tional will by attempting to restrict the President's actions in this
situation.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the text of the Constitution nowhere expressly grants the
President the power to conclude executive agreements, nowhere does it
preclude their use. If the President, or either of the other branches of
government, is to be restricted to those powers enumerated in the Con-
stitution, executive agreements are clearly impermissible. Both statute
and case law, however, have acknowledged that certain powers inhere
in each of the branches of government. The Supreme Court may extend
Dames and hold that nothing prevents the President, even in non-
emergency situations, from unilaterally negotiating and consummating
international agreements pursuant to such inherent authority, subject,
of course, to the proviso that they be within constitutional limits.
2 7
This is particularly so if the President, as Executive, is considered to
have primary power to act in foreign relations. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of any unequivocal objection by Congress to these agreements,
the courts will validate them as either a custom acquiesced in by Con-
gress or a power impliedly delegated to the President.
Critics of executive agreements have argued that if these agree-
ments are intended to be law, as they surely are, they can only be con-
cluded by Congress. Furthermore, they argue that because executive
agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution, they cannot be legit-
255. See HENKIN, supra note 27, at 181; E. CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PoW-
ERS 214 (4th ed. 1957).
256. President Reagan, of course, "ratified" the Algerian Accords in Executive Order No.
12,294, although he expressed his dissatisfaction with certain provisions of the agreement.
See Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111-12 (1981); President's Message to Congress
on Suspension of Litigation Against Iran, 17 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 189 (Feb. 24,
1981).
257. "Mhe very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations. . . must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Curths- Wright, 299 U.S. at
320.
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imate unless elevated to the level of the "Supreme Law of the Land" by
a constitutional amendment 5 8
Nevertheless, the President should be given some flexibility to act
without resort to the treaty process, particularly in emergency situa-
tions. In such circumstances, the legality of a specific executive agree-
ment will depend upon whether a court is willing to read between the
lines of the Constitution and any relevant statute, to ignore arguments
concerning the expressed intent of the Founders designed to limit exec-
utive power, and to conclude that the two political branches have at
least impliedly cooperated to bring about the court's desired result. It is
thus that "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the impera-
tives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on ab-
stract theories of law." 59
James D. Redwood
258. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 80, at 54: "If present exigencies demand a redistribution
of powers in which Congress was originally fully to share. . . that decision ought candidly
to be submitted to the people in the form of a proposed amendment ..
259. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying
note 158.
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